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Introduction 
If you want to affect other people, you should - first and foremost - affect yourself. If you want 
others to act responsibly, you should reflect critically on your own notions of responsibility. If you 
want to enter into dialogue with others, you need to enter into dialogue with yourself to prepare an 
open-minded and listening attitude.  
These statements do not merely apply to an individual level, but also to a cultural level. In 
consequence, a critical reflection on one’s own culture is an important basis for opening one’s mind 
to dialogue with other cultures.  
An open-minded approach does not equal pure relativism, but should interact with a decisive 
approach to the need of responsibility, compared with challenges of cross-cultural interest - such as 
global ecological problems in general, and specifically, human-induced climate change. 
In the light of these introductory reflections, the aim of this paper is to contribute to an 
intercultural dialogue on responsibility towards nature, centred round a critical discussion of 
responsibility in Western culture, which represents the cultural background of the author. Since 
responsibility towards nature is the main issue, a focal point is view of nature, but perceived as an 
integrated aspect of a general life and world view. 
A critical discussion may need a frame of reference for the critique. The quest is for a 
perspective on responsibility which may appeal cross-culturally. Knowing fully that the 
identification of such perspective is influenced by history and culture, the validity of the perspective 
should be tried out through a dialogue. 
The content of this paper is organised in three sections: 
1. In brief, the next section presents a general perspective on conditions of responsibility, 
relevant to intercultural dialogue on values in relation to problems of common interest. 
2. With reference to predominant views rooted in Western culture, the main content of the 
paper is a discussion on causes of ecological problems; barriers to solutions to the 
problems (lack of responsibility); and barriers to an equal dialogue between cultures. 
3. Finally, the previously outlined perspective on conditions of responsibility and its 
implications are reconsidered.  
 
A perspective on conditions of responsibility, relevant to intercultural 
dialogue 
In between an open-minded and a decisive approach 
Problems that concern all people on earth - such as global environmental problems and specifically 
human-induced climate change - provide us with a dilemma between: 
- A decisive approach to the necessity of problem solving, including the adoption of 
responsible attitudes and actions. The risk is dogmatic universalism, regardless of 
cultural diversity. 
- An open-minded approach to the variety of cultures, including a respectful attitude 
towards cultural diversity. The risk is pure relativism, regardless of the necessity of 
problem solving. 
The basic assumption that human beings are situated in between a decisive and an open 
approach is not related to specific problems. Rather, it is a condition of our human existence, 
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including human understanding, human dialogue, and not least intercultural dialogue. In any 
dialogue, and as receptive beings, we are challenged to open our minds to unexpected views of 
other participants, even if these views are at variance with our conventional thinking. However, 
when the aim is to contribute to the dialogue, we cannot adopt a solely receptive approach, but we 
should also propound our own views. How can we set an agenda which satisfies the approach ‘in- 
between’- meaning in between openness and decisiveness? 
As a contribution to the dialogue on responsibility towards nature, this paper searches for a 
perspective which may appeal cross-culturally.  
Hence, the following question will be reflected: What are the conditions of responsibility? Since 
the aim is to discuss responsibility towards nature, the question may be specified as follows: What 
are the conditions of responsibility towards nature?  
Responsibility towards nature, however, is merely a special instance of responsibility in general.  
Conditions of responsibility: a general perspective  
Let me take my starting point in a statement presented by a speaker on the floor at a public hearing 
in Nairobi in 1986, arranged by the World Commission on Environment and Development, which 
published the report “Our Common Future” in 1987. The statement is quoted in the report, and it 
reads as follows: 
  
”If the desert is growing, forest disappearing, malnutrition increasing, and people 
in urban areas living in very bad conditions, it is not because we are lacking 
resources but the kind of policy implemented by our rulers, by the elite group. 
Denying people rights and peoples' interests is pushing us to a situation where it is 
only the poverty that has a very prosperous future in Africa. And it is our hope that 
your Commission, the World Commission, will not overlook these problems of 
human rights in Africa and will put emphasis on it. Because it is only free people, 
people who have rights, who are mature and responsible citizens, who then 
participate in the development and in the protection of the environment.”(World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987, Chapter 2, section 19). 
 
Especially, the keywords “free people”, including “people who have rights”, should be noticed. 
People who are suppressed, who are exposed to power, cannot be expected to take responsibility for 
matters of general interest, such as global ecological problems. Hence, freedom of people is 
assumed to be a first condition for responsibility; namely for the ability to act with responsibility. 
The ability to act responsibly has a counterpart in the challenge to act responsibly. 
Responsibility is oriented towards an otherness, meaning something else than oneself. Depending 
on the situation, the otherness may include other people whether close or at distance, such as 
mankind and future generations, and the otherness may include non-human phenomena, such as 
local nature or the entire earth. The challenge to act responsibly depends on an alliance or 
connection or sympathetic interdependence with the otherness in question – or, more openly 
formulated: a meaningful relationship. If other people or nature are outdistanced merely as objects 
separated form ourselves as subjects, then we have renounced any obligation to responsibility 
towards these objects. As merely an object, people and nature are not subjects to respectful 
treatment and do not represent an end in themselves; but they lie open to being exploited as a 
means, as a resource to achieve our ego-centred aims. Hence, a committing sense of meaning in the 
relationship with the otherness in question is assumed to be a second condition for responsibility.  
The above considerations lead to a general perspective on responsibility, expressed by two basic 
assumptions (Christensen 2004): 
 
 4 
1) The necessity of responsible action in relation to an otherness 
depends on a committing sense of meaning in the relationship 
between ourselves and the otherness in question. 
2) The ability to take responsible action depends on the freedom of 
people to act according to the experienced necessity. 
 
The two core concepts, ‘committing sense of meaning in the relationship’1 and ‘freedom of 
people’, are subjects to a variety of interpretations, depending on history and culture. No culture 
should monopolise the interpretation. For instance, human freedom is a key concept in modern 
Western culture, but often interpreted in a specific way, namely in terms of freedom and rights of 
the individual person. The intention of intercultural dialogue challenges a Western person (such as 
the author) to adopt an open-minded approach to various interpretations of the concept of ‘freedom 
of people’ and how different interpretations may interact with responsibility towards an otherness.      
Immediately, the two assumptions may appear as opposites, but they should be perceived as 
supplementary or rather as parts of the same piece. Freedom of people without a meaningful 
relationship with the otherness may very easily lead to the exercise of power. Meaning in the 
relationship with the otherness without freedom of people may very easily lead to subjection under 
enforced doctrines.  
 
A critical discussion of Western culture 
Three main problems 
A critical discussion of Western culture will pay attention to three main problems, meaning three 
constraints on responsible attitudes and actions. 
 
Problem A: Causes of ecological problems (including human-induced climate change).  
A dominant view in Western culture is that man is separated from nature and has the right to 
exercise power over nature for the sake of human wealth and welfare. Man’s power over nature is 
legitimated by man’s freedom from nature at the expense of a committing meaning in the 
relationship with nature. Thereby, a path is opened to exploitation of nature for human purposes, 
resulting in a pressure on nature (ecological problems). 
 
Problem B: Barriers to solutions to ecological problems.  
Cultures may be subject to ‘context fixation’, meaning that efforts to solve historically new 
problems refer to the same basic views that lie behind the emergence of the problems. When this 
happens, the risk is that the problems continue to be reinforced, relatively unaffected of the efforts 
to solve them. This second problem concerns the way of reacting to the problems, especially the 
models of problem-solving. 
 
Problem C: Barriers to an equal dialogue between cultures.  
The powerful force of Western culture towards nature has a counterpart in its powerful force 
towards other cultures. First, the Western practise tends to expand globally, including the embedded 
                                                
1 Instead of this collocation of words, I can use a simplified term in Danish, namely ʻsamhørighedʼ 
(Christensen 2004). I have not found a good term in English with similar connotations. If we think in terms of 
ʻmutual dependenceʼ between man and nature, for instance, we should recognise that human life depends 
on nature, but nature can do without human beings. 
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views of nature, science, technology, and economy. Thereby, other cultural practises and views tend 
to be marginalised. Second, as Western culture may seem promising in terms of material wealth, 
this culture also attracts people from other cultures. Consequently, these people contribute to the 
erosion of potentials for responsibility towards nature in their own cultures. 
 
A substantial elaboration on problem A is a precondition for further reflections on problems B and 
C.  
Problem A: Causes of ecological problems 
Notions of human freedom at the expense of meaning in the relationship between 
humans and nature 
What is freedom in Western culture?  
Certainly, notions of freedom include political freedom, intellectual freedom, and not least 
human rights centred round individual freedom. But freedom is also something else.  
Freedom includes the right of individuals to pursue their aspirations for material wealth, despite 
the fact that extensive material consumption causes ecological problems. As consumers, we are free 
to buy goods within the extent of our financial capacity. Consumer freedom of choice is a keyword. 
As a specific but important example, individual freedom entails the right to move from place to 
place in flights and cars and other means of transport which contribute considerably to carbon 
dioxide emissions. Individual mobility symbolises individual freedom.     
Freedom includes the right of producers to pursue their aspirations for economic profit, although 
with respect for environmental legislation. Free competition and free market, including free 
movement of capital, are keywords for private enterprises, even if the market-based competition 
exerts pressure on the producers to exert pressure on the natural environment. 
The role of national governments and international authorities (such as the European Union) is 
twofold. Contemporary with their efforts to protect the environment, such authorities contribute to 
promoting the conditions of growth in material production and consumption. Two notions of 
responsibility conflict with each other; on the one hand, the responsibility towards the environment; 
on the other, the responsibility towards growth in the freedom to produce and consume.  
The above considerations are more or less commonplaces. It is a commonplace that responsible 
governments should promote the growth in production and consumption to the benefit of societal 
and individual wealth. This is a commonplace, however, just because this kind of development is 
expressive of a dominant life perspective, deeply rooted in Western culture, but still more extended 
to the global level. Furthermore, this life perspective appears as incontestable, because it is closely 
associated with incontestable notions of human freedom. 
When it comes to ecological responsibility, modern Western culture is faced with a difficulty. 
What should determine the necessity of responsibility towards nature? Certainly, a committing 
sense of meaning in the man-nature relationship may lie behind current activities for preservation of 
nature, such as an attitude of respect for eco-diversity or bio-diversity. Historically, however, a 
dominant view of nature is the emancipation of man from nature. Freedom of man from nature 
includes the freedom of man to gain power over nature.  
The history behind man’s power over nature is complex and includes many controversies (cf. 
discussions in, among others, White 1967, Passmore 1974, Attfield 1991). One attempt - indeed 
very simplified - to identify basic issues refer to three points, namely man’s right, man’s ability, and 
man’s will to master and exploit nature (Christensen 2007). 
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Man’s right to master nature 
Briefly pointed out, man’s rightful freedom to exercise mastery over nature is legitimated by the 
following conceptions of man’s place and role in nature: 
a) Man is separated from nature. This implies that nature is defined as an external entity.  
b) Man is superior to nature. This implies that nature is perceived as subordinate to man.  
c) No values in nature and no alliance between man and nature exist, which could oblige 
man to take care of nature.  
d) Values and obligations belong to the human sphere, exclusively. 
Man’s mastery over nature concerns the secular sphere, centred round science and technology in 
combination with economy and legislation. However, the secular view of nature has religious roots.  
In the religious tradition, the Judeo-Christian, man was created in God’s image, and it was 
man’s duty on earth to fulfil the divine command. The tradition contains an important distinction 
between the Creator and the Creation, between the divine and the mundane, between God and 
nature. With reference to one of the early Church Fathers, St. Augustine (about 397), man should 
renounce any interest in nature as a substance, both his carnal desire and his empirical curiosity. 
The idea of human freedom did not concern any bodily mass, such as the physical qualities of man 
and nature, but the human soul in its relation to the transcendent God and the eternal life. For 
instance, St. Augustine reports his sense of freedom when he had released himself from the 
sensuous desire to achieve a spiritual contact with the divinity: “Now was my soul free from the 
gnawing cares of seeking and getting, of wallowing in the mire and scratching the itch of lust” (St. 
Augustine, Book 9, Chapter I). 
The religious tradition implied that nature was perceived as empty of value. Nature did not 
contain any kind of gods, souls or spiritual affinity with man (qua idolatry, immanent divinities 
were forbidden). Man’s superior place, compared with nature, referred to the view that man was 
created in God’s image. When later in history the secular sphere took a dominant position, 
combined with an outward interest in nature, it could build on the religious tradition (even if the 
secular sphere defined itself in contrast to the religious sphere). Nature lay open to being defined as 
an object of empirical studies and as a means of human utilisation. Man had free access to capture 
his rightful place as superior to nature and assume his rightful role as the master of nature. Values 
and obligations were determined within the human sphere, exclusively. Secular affairs such as the 
development of science, technology, and economy should in no way be influenced by moral 
authorities beyond the human sphere, let it be nature or God.    
Man’s ability to master nature 
Man’s ability to master nature depends on the development of knowledge about nature and practical 
means which can be used for exercising mastery, especially objective knowledge (or pretended 
value-free knowledge) in combination with powerful technology. 
Historically, Francis Bacon’s ideas about a practically oriented science may serve as an 
illustrative focal point (Bacon 1996). Bacon pointed out that “human knowledge and human power 
come to the same thing”, and “we can only command Nature by obeying her”. Obeying nature 
depends on knowledge of causes and effects, for “where the cause is not known the effect cannot be 
produced” (ibid, aphorism 3). Bacon’s ideas concerned “the kingdom of man” (ibid, p. 43), among 
others expressed by his intention to “lay down firmer foundations for the power and grandeur of 
man, and extend their limits more widely” (ibid, aphorism 116). “The dominion of man over 
nature”, Bacon stated, “rests solely in the arts and the sciences”; so “let the human race only recover 
its God-given right over Nature, and be given the necessary power; then right reason and sound 
religion will govern the exercise of it” (ibid, aphorism 129).  
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Bacon’s ideas were published in 1620. However, and in spite of many historical changes, 
similar ideas characterise the current striving for a scientific and technological development which 
extends man’s ability to gain power over nature. In his book ‘Chance and necessity’ from 1970, a 
modern author, Jacques Monod, argued in favour of objective knowledge, because of its ability to 
promote human performance. Even though the idea of objectivity in science appeared as “cold and 
austere, proposing no explanation but imposing an ascetic renunciation of all other spiritual fare”, 
and even though “it ended the ancient animist covenant between man and nature”, there is one 
reason that this idea has gained priority: “if it has commanded recognition, this is solely because of 
its prodigious powers of performance.” Finally, Monod concludes: “The ancient covenant is in 
pieces; man at last knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which 
he emerged only by chance. Neither his destiny nor his duty have been written down. The kingdom 
above or the darkness below: it is for him to choose” (Monod 1970). 
Man’s will to master nature 
Our will depends on our life perspectives, including the perspectives of life embedded in our 
practical activities. Especially, our aspirations for ceaseless progress in material wealth are 
expressive of a life perspective which implies man’s will to master nature. Both altruistic and 
egoistic motives may appear. 
The altruistic man is the citizen who dedicates his will to the preservation and creation of 
societal values. Historically, an important idea is that societal values are created by human beings 
and by means of human labour, especially by improving nature, while nature in itself contains no 
real value. A glance at John Locke is illustrative. 
In 1690, John Locke stated that man was determined to labour, both because of religion and 
because of human reason: “God commanded and his wants forced him to labour” (Locke 1690, sec. 
35, cf. sec. 32). God had given the earth to “mankind in common” (ibid, sec. 25), but “every man 
has a property in his own person”, including “the labour of his body” (ibid, sec. 27). If a man 
improves a piece of land by means of his own labour, and thereby adds something to it “that was his 
property”, then he is allowed to “enclose it from the common” (ibid, sec. 32). Subduing the earth 
and improving it for the benefit of (human) life by laying down labour upon it (cf. ibid, sec. 32) 
contributes to the societal value creation: “… he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, 
does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind” (ibid, sec. 37). The raw nature, as it is 
in itself, contributes with nearly no value: “It is labour then which puts the greatest part of value 
upon land … nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless materials, as in themselves” 
(ibid, sec. 43). 
From Locke’s perspective, and unlike for instance the view of the contemplative man, the 
industrious man who adopts the claim to work as a dominant life perspective should be idealised as 
a socially responsible being. It means that willingness to work in order to contribute to the mastery 
and improvement of nature for the sake of value creation within the human sphere is an expression 
of responsibility. Social responsibility may include the view that also poor people should enjoy the 
material richness known from the industrialised countries. Additionally: How could people be 
expected to claim responsibility for nature and ecology, including the entire earth, if they have not 
achieved material richness? 
The egoistic man is the individual whose will is directed towards his own self-interest, whether 
as a producer who strives to gain profit or a consumer who strives to acquire material goods. It is 
the man who adopts the idea that more money and more consumer goods are expressive of human 
freedom - maybe the meaning of life? It is the man who subordinates his aspirations to the idea of 
ceaseless progress, defined in terms of growth in material production and consumption. ‘To earn 
money, to buy, to consume’ appears a leading life perspective; if not explicitly formulated, then 
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implicitly embedded in the factual behaviour, permitted by the basic idea that human freedom is a 
separate issue, independent of man’s relationship with nature and despite the ecological 
consequences.  
‘Greed and growth’ may stand as keywords for the egoistic man. Greed appears a leitmotif of 
the individual who orients his will towards buying and consuming more and more. Governments 
may perceive themselves as responsible, and thereby altruistic, when the political will is oriented 
towards promoting growth in production and consumption, underpinned by conventional scientific 
and technological development. A powerful argument is that if this policy is not followed, then the 
nation is in danger of loosing its wealth and its internationally competitive strength. The altruism, 
however, remains solely within the human sphere, but excludes the non-human nature.     
A predominant view - in spite of changeability and multiplicity 
Obviously, the above considerations do not represent the whole truth. Western culture, as well as 
globalised culture, changes historically, influenced by changing conditions. At all levels from local 
to global, ecological problems have been given increased attention during the latest maybe half a 
century. From about 1970, environmental movements have challenged the dominating concepts of 
development. Since the Brundtland Report was published in 1987, the idea that environment and 
development are inseparable has gained acceptance, and sustainable development has become a 
catchword. Recently, the climate change problem (which has been known for decades, cf. the fact 
that IPCC, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, was established in 1988), has been put 
on the global political agenda. 
The historical changeability has a counterpart in cultural and sub-cultural multiplicity. Within a 
westernised cultural context, various practises, such as endeavours to conserve ecological systems, 
natural resorts, species of plants and animals, as well as endeavours to create ecologically sound 
systems of production, indicate the existence of a committing sense of meaning in the man-nature 
relationship. 
Despite of many nuances, however, the picture painted above mirrors a predominant view, 
embedded in the globalised practise and underlying the global ecological problems in our age. With 
this picture as a background, it is time to comment on the two other main problems, previously 
mentioned, namely barriers to solutions to the ecological problems and barriers to an equal dialogue 
between cultures.  
Problem B: Barriers to solutions to the ecological problems 
The tendency to ‘context-fixation’ and the quest for change of context 
Problems change during the course of history. The change may include a change of the essential 
character of the problems, meaning that the problems appear to be of a new kind. When this 
happens, a responsible attitude should include a search for new and adequate models of problem-
solving, different from the hitherto applied models, both practically and as regards the underlying 
conceptions.   
Historically, many societies have been faced with ecological problems. However, the current 
ecological problems in general, and especially the human-induced climatic change, appear 
qualitatively different from previous problems. Unlike the global extent of the current challenges, 
the challenges in former times were often more or less locally situated. In principle, people could 
respond to the problems in two ways. One possibility was to develop new conceptions, values, and 
practises locally. Another possibility was to migrate to another locality and thereby escape the 
problems.  
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Also today, many people make an attempt to use the second possibility by migrating in order to 
create better living conditions. The climate change, however, is a condition which is not subject to 
evasion. Therefore, we are compelled to choose the first possibility by developing new models of 
problem-solving, including conceptions, values, and practises, but at a global level and as a 
challenge to all societies and cultures on earth. 
It happens that humans and societies apply old models of problem-solving to new problems, 
regardless of the qualitative difference between the problems of different ages. When this is the 
case, a meta-problem turns up, here designated a ‘context-fixation’. A ‘context-fixation’ appears 
whenever the attempted solution to a problem reproduces its causes, at least in important respects. 
The term of ‘context-fixation’ refers to a persistence of the context by which both the causes of the 
problems and the attempted solutions are framed.2 
Even if old problem-solving models did respond adequately to contemporary problems, it is not 
certain that the same models would also respond adequately to current problems. As indicated, the 
development of objective sciences and powerful technologies aiming at growth in material wealth is 
based on the idea of man’s freedom from nature and the perception of nature as a means for man’s 
mastery and exploitation. This development may have responded adequately to the poverty of 
people in a previous time, but forms a barrier to the development of thorough solutions to the 
present global ecological problems. 
More of the same – i.e. more scientific and technological development, based on the same 
cultural view that lies behind the problems - tends to characterise attempted solutions. With 
reference to ‘new kinds of fundamentalism’, the Finnish philosopher G.H. von Wright points out a 
fundamentalist doctrine, the attitude called ‘scientism’. “This term”, von Wright states, “denotes the 
belief that science and technology is capable of solving the problems caused by their own progress 
and that they are capable of creating a life-style which may initiate a new era in the history of 
mankind” (von Wright 1994, 82). Even though it may be seen as an extreme example, efforts to 
develop carbon capture and storage technologies may show the point.  
Also, the continued efforts to maximise growth in material production and consumption tend to 
hold their own inertia. From an altruistic view, the responsible politician may argue that the 
continued growth is a precondition for solving ecological problems. The producer may argue that he 
exercises responsibility, both because he creates jobs and because he contributes to the wealth in his 
society. The individual consumer will hardly consider himself as greedy when he strives for earning 
more money in order to travel more by flight, buy a bigger house and a bigger car, or in general, to 
extend his material consumption. He just follows the ordinary behaviour in his own culture: He uses 
his freedom to buy and consume within the limits of his financial capacity – and he demonstrates 
responsibility for the welfare of his family.  
Within the cultural context, all such stakeholders may claim to act responsibly, despite the fact 
that their activities contribute to reinforcing the human influence on the climate. Without really 
disturbing the context, the predominating climate discourse is centred round the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. While reduction refers to the level of content, the quest for new models 
of problem-solving will imply a change of context. Change of context, however, is still more 
provoking than change of content, as it will imply a change of well-established rights, customs, and, 
not least, life perspectives, including deeply rooted notions of freedom.  
Tendencies to persistence despite change 
In general, all cultures hold both static and dynamic elements. The static quality of the indicated 
context-fixation is not absolute, and the tendencies to persistence are met by change. Prompted by 
                                                
2 Considerations about persistence and change are inspired by Watzlawick et al 1974. 
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the awareness of the qualitatively new ecological problems, critical discussions about man’s 
relation to nature as well as a search for alternatives have taken place during recent decades. The 
intention of a sustainable development may serve as an example.  
At the ideal level, the Brundtland Report defined a sustainable development as a “development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, Chapter 2, 
paragraph 1). Compared with a characteristic of previous ethics, namely the proximity in (Western) 
ethics emphasised by the German philosopher Hans Jonas, who indicates “the confinement (of 
traditional ethics) to the immediate setting of the action” (Jonas 1984, 5), the definition extends 
ethical considerations to mankind in general, including future generations. So far, the definition 
represents a crucial change. On the other hand, the definition reproduces the human-centred view 
known from the Western tradition, namely by focusing on human needs. From this point, the 
definition represents a persistent tendency, exactly a ‘context-fixation’.  
At the practical level, endeavours for a sustainable development may include preservation of 
biodiversity, not substantiated by human needs, merely, but also by a committing sense of meaning 
in the man-nature relationship, independent of human utilisation. Contemporary with such 
potentials for change, however, practise carries its own inertia. G. H. von Wright indicates the 
existence of an autonomous techno-system, “an alliance between science, technology and industrial 
production”, which develops on its own conditions and follows its own laws, independent of the 
traditional political systems (von Wright 1994, 111-114). To a high degree, the power of the techno-
system, based on man’s mastery of nature; directed towards growth in material production and 
consumption, and resulting in ecological problems, seems to outdistance the power of the political 
endeavours to achieve sustainable development. This is not only due to the inherent inertia of the 
techno-system, but also because the political systems continue to support the development of the 
selfsame system, despite of the agenda of sustainable development. 
Figuratively speaking, a context-fixation implies that the cure reproduces the causes behind the 
symptoms. Consequently, the cure may even intensify the illness. While people may use pills to 
alleviate symptoms, political systems may apply the carbon dioxide quota trading system as a 
medicament, based on the market mechanism which promotes the development of the techno-
system (the market mechanism may even be perceived as an integrated part of the techno-system). 
Even if the CO2 trade indicates an adaptation of the market mechanism to new problems, it also 
exemplifies the tendency to stick to old models of problem-solving, including the underlying 
conceptions and values. 
Problem C: Barriers to an equal dialogue between cultures. 
The power of the ‘techno-system’ over the human mind 
Ziauddin Sardar, a Pakistan-born culture critic, opens an article about ‘Development and the 
Locations of Eurocentrism’ with the following sentence: “The real power of the West is not located 
in its economic muscle and technological might. Rather it resides in its power to define” (Sardar 
1999, 44). Sardar indicates how many Eurocentric categories play an intrinsic role in development. 
Among others, he mentions the categories liberal secularism, freedom, nation state, civilization, 
modernization, and the ideology of science and technology, and he pinpoints that “development 
continues to mean what it always meant: a standard by which the West measures the non-West” 
(ibid, 49, 52-53).  
Power over nature has a counterpart in power over the human mind. First, the idea of man’s 
legitimate power over nature, manifested in scientific, technological, and economic development, 
briefly spoken the ‘techno-system’, tends to invade the mind of people in Western culture - if not as 
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a spoken ideal, then when it comes to practise (cf. the above discussion of problem B). Second, the 
invasion of the human mind of such ideas is not limited to Western culture, but tends to be extended 
globally. The consequence is marginalisation of cultures with traditionally more cautious attitudes 
to and practises with nature.  
A look into such culture may contribute to the discussion. 
In an analysis of the cosmology, including view of nature, among the Tukano Indians of the 
Colombian Northwest Amazon, the Austrian born anthropologist G. Reichel-Dolmatoff (1976) 
discusses the Tukano universe as “a limited, well defined proposition with finite and restricted 
resources” (ibid, 309). In a spiritual sense, not only in a germinal, biological sense, the energy of the 
sun, imagined by the Tukanos in terms of seminal light and heat, causes plants to grow, fruit to 
ripen, and mankind and animals to reproduce. The spiritual energy from the sun is a masculine 
element that fertilises a feminine element; that is, this world. As soon as the game or the fruit is 
converted into nourishment, the energy is conserved, but now at the level of society. However, 
society only borrows this energy and it should be reincorporated into the cosmic circuit.  
One practical implication of this conception is that the energy is thought to be diminished when 
an animal is killed. The hunter should obtain permission from ‘The Master of Animals’ to kill, and 
he should undergo a rigorous preparation, among others in terms of sexual continence in accordance 
with the seminal character of the circuit of spiritual energy. For instance, the hunter should refrain 
from all sexual relations some days before hunting, and, furthermore, he should not have had any 
dreams with an erotic content. Moreover, it is necessary that none of the women who live in his 
household is menstruating.  
Another practical consequence of the Tukano cosmology appears when a person gets ill. Illness 
is perceived as a consequence of disturbance of the balance in the spiritual energy flow, and the 
shaman as a healer does not so much interfere at the individual level, but rather at the level of supra-
individual structures. The diagnosis may be established by experiences in the shaman’s dream or 
trance.  
Among the Tukano’s, Reichel-Dolmatoff states, “there is usually little interest in new 
knowledge that might be used for exploiting the environment more effectively and there is little 
concern for maximising short-term gains or for obtaining more food or raw-materials than are 
actually needed.” On the contrary, there is interest in knowledge about “what the physical world 
needs from man” as “man must bring himself into conformity with nature if he wants to exist as 
part of nature’s unity, and must fit his demands to nature’s availabilities” (ibid, 310-311). 
Faced with such view, a person who is enslaved by the power of the globally dominating 
conceptions of science, technology, and economy may object: ‘This sounds very nice, but also too 
“romantic”.’ Furthermore: ‘Surely, the Tukano universe is expressive of a meaningful and 
committing relationship between man and nature - but what about notions of human freedom?’ 
Moreover: ‘Even if the Tukano universe may prompt to responsibility towards nature, it solely 
functions under local conditions; it does not correspond to the challenges of a globalised world.’ 
Obviously, my point is not to argue that we all should think and act like the Tukano indians, but 
only to indicate the marginalisation of such culture. In agreement with Sardar’s accentuation of the 
power of Western definitions: Real knowledge is based on the principles of the Western category 
‘science’! Technological innovation is scientifically based! Economy is about material growth, 
conditioned by market mechanisms, and economy is calculable in terms of money! These are 
keystones of Development (in the singular and with capital letter ‘D’). These are core conceptions 
of the globalised techno-system. This techno-system is in no way subject to being contradicted or 
challenged profoundly. Solely, it is subject to correctives, for instance by means of environmental 
legislation, which may contribute to its continuance. From this perspective, the Tukano view makes 
no sense. It is nonsense. 
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An inclusion / exclusion perspective 
An inclusion / exclusion perspective may contribute to the point. Imagine the techno-system as a 
sphere, diffuse in its shape but widespread over the planet of earth; covering some localities and 
regions but not all; benefiting some people in these localities and regions but not all; influencing 
some but not all of the conceptions and values of these people, but nevertheless powerful in its 
practical implications, including its pressure on the natural resources, the ecosystems, and also the 
climate. If you are included in this sphere; if your viewpoints and arguments respect its basic 
premises, then you may be listened to, even when you put forward critical points. But if your 
viewpoints and arguments are outside the sphere; if they are too different from the dominating 
context, then you may very easily become exposed to exclusion: ‘This is not relevant. This is not 
the way we do things around here.’ 
As a member of Western culture, I have indeed no personal experience of the exclusion of 
cultures different from the Western. But I have the experience from sub-cultural views, different 
from the predominating cultural views, not at least the views among people engaged in organic 
farming. When organic farming arose in the 1970s, it appeared to be a radical alternative, not only 
technically, but also as regards conceptions of and attitudes to human life, including the relationship 
between humans and nature. In retrospect, my interpretation is that there was a quest for ideas and 
practises that satisfied the simultaneity of human freedom and responsibility towards nature, based 
on a committing sense of meaning in the relationship. As humans, it was often stated, ‘we are not 
separate from nature, but part of nature’. The predominating reaction from ‘the establishment’ was 
an exclusion of these sub-cultural views: ‘This is romanticism, religion, nostalgia’ (Christensen 
1998). 
Marginalisation or exclusion forms a barrier to an equal dialogue, whether it is between a 
historically dominating culture and emerging sub-cultures or between a globally dominating culture 
and different cultures on earth. Marginalisation may result in the experience of alienation, 
especially when the difficulty of being listened to and respected evokes a sense of cultural 
inferiority or even a personal failure.  
The most serious threat to an equal dialogue, however, is not the very process of exclusion. 
Rather, it is the aspiration to be included. This aspiration may show itself in two ways. 
First, it is a matter of fact that the globalised techno-system produces material wealth, at least to 
the benefit of some people. If not experienced otherwise, then television, films and advertisements 
will show. Perceived as a manifestation of human freedom, the promising prospects of access to 
material goods and material consumption may seem more attractive to materially poor people than 
the challenges of realising a lifestyle that includes responsibility towards nature.    
Second, aspirations to become a respected member of and participant in a factually dominating 
culture may result in the adoption of the language of this culture, its words and their connotations; 
thereby also its concepts and categories and definitions, such as the globally dominating 
conceptions of science, technology, and economy, including the perception of nature as a 
‘resource’. When the language of power is adopted, then the power has really gained impact.  
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Final considerations on intercultural dialogue and responsibility 
towards nature 
A core question and additional reflections 
Questioning the self-evidence of basic assumptions in ones own culture is a precondition for 
entering into an open-minded dialogue with other cultures. The above considerations on three main 
problems are meant to render visible such basic assumptions and to challenge their self-evidence.  
In the search for an approach to an intercultural dialogue that addresses the current global 
ecological problems adequately, two conditions of responsibility have been stated. The one 
concerns a committing sense of meaning in our relation to the otherness in question. The other 
concerns human freedom as a precondition for taking responsible action. A core question is how 
those two conditions can go hand in hand, particularly in man’s relation to nature:  
 
How can a committing sense of meaning in man’s relation to 
nature go hand in hand with human freedom? 
 
Two additional reflections are important: 
1. Re ‘intercultural dialogue’. The quest is for an approach to dialogue on responsibility 
with cross-cultural appeal – or stronger formulated: with universally human appeal. The 
validity in this respect is open to discussion, knowing fully that the identification of the 
two conditions of responsibility is influenced by the attention given to a lack of 
responsibility in the Western view of nature, especially the perversion of human freedom 
and the absence of a committing sense of meaning in the man-nature relationship.  
2. Re ‘addresses the current ecological problems adequately’. If the simultaneity of the two 
conditions of responsibility should gain impact, not only at an ideal level, but also with 
considerable influence on the globally dominating practise, then there is a quest for 
positively engaging notions of both. The quest is for responses to the question that may 
serve as leitmotifs for the good life.  
Tentative hints on implications of the question 
As a participant in a dialogue, you can contribute with views solely from your own position, but 
you cannot speak from the positions of other participants. If you attempt to do so, you project your 
own views onto the others instead of listening respectfully. Therefore, final and tentative hints on 
implications of the above formulated question will be restricted to views that refer to my own 
cultural background. I venture to include references to a few Scandinavian philosophers, even 
though my interpretations and comments will appear extremely brief. 
Above, I mentioned the ideas about and experiments with organic farming in Denmark. At least 
in its initial phase, organic farming appeared as a search for a positive perspective. Responsibility 
towards nature, based on a closer contact and co-operation with nature, should be combined with an 
attentive attitude to human life and to human creativity, thereby expressive of a search for human 
freedom. 
In the same period, the 1970s, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss (1976) propounded ideas 
about an eco-philosophy, designated ‘Ecosophy T’ (the letter ‘T’ indicates the possibility of a 
variety of ‘ecosophies’). Of particular interest in this connection is Næss’ discussion of two 
inseparable concepts of ‘identification’ and ‘self-realisation’, framed by the idea that nothing exists 
only for the sake of human beings, but everything is interconnected, even though life has a 
particular position. Our ability to identify ourselves with life as such and with everything is 
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unlimited. This implies that we, the human beings, form part of meaningful relationships. Self-
realisation has connotations of freedom, not in an ego-centred sense, but related to a ‘bigger Self’. 
An interpretation of Næss is that what is considered as best for our ‘Self’ is intimately connected 
with the best to life and to everything, including the best to non-human nature. 
If freedom is linked to self-reflection, existentially spoken, then it seems evident that the quest 
for freedom should imply that attention is given to our embedment in bigger connections. Even a 
down-to-earth view urges us to realise that we have not born ourselves, and mankind did not 
emerge from nothing. More profoundly, freedom perceived as an existential issue that concerns our 
experience of our ‘self’ may lead to the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard: First, the self is a 
relation relating itself to itself; second, the self is not the relation as such, but the fact that the 
relation is relating itself to itself; third, the fact that the relation is relating itself to itself implies its 
relation to an otherness, namely the otherness that has established the whole relationship 
(Kierkegaard 1989, 173). Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the self refers to Christianity, but the 
interesting point in this connection is the very figure of thought; namely that the human self is 
inseparably related to an underlying otherness. The core point is that the more we realise our selves 
attentively, the more it becomes obvious that we are meaningfully related to an otherness, and this 
otherness may include non-human nature or the planet of earth. 
The Danish philosopher K. E. Løgstrup (1995a, 1995b) argues that nature is not merely our 
surroundings, but also our origin. Not least with reference to our sensory perception, it appears 
obvious that we are embedded in nature (including the whole universe). Particularly, Løgstrup 
emphasises the concept of ‘distanceless sensation’: “The edge of the wood is not outside my 
sensation, but outside my body. The edge of the wood is not different from me due to my sensation, 
but due to my understanding.” And Løgstrup continues: “If it was up to the sensation, there would 
be no difference between outside and inside, no more than there would be any difference between 
the sensed and the sensing” (Løgstrup 1995b, 111). It is not the sensory perception as such that 
establishes a distance to nature, but our understanding, and still more our transformation of the 
understanding into language. A possible interpretation of Løgstrup is that sensory awareness 
implies an experience of the inseparability between our selves and nature. A possible objection is 
the point that the sensory awareness is merely contemplative, but of no use in terms of practical 
matters. However, while “the scientist eliminates the sensation, the artist insists on it”, Løgstrup 
states (1995a, 18). As an alternative to the reifying attitude to life and world that penetrates the 
globalised techno-system, the quest for a responsible practise towards nature may lead to a focus on 
an artistic attitude to human insight as well as to human creativity (cf. Christensen 2009). 
These few hints indicate some approaches in which human freedom and meaning in the 
relationship with nature appear as parts of the same piece, rather than opposites. 
Two questions remain open:  
1. Re ‘intercultural dialogue’. Assuming that the general concepts of ‘human freedom’ and 
‘a committing sense of meaning in the human relationship with non-human nature’ as 
well as their interrelations are subject to a variety of specific conceptions, depending on 
culture, the following question may promote a further discussion: How do ideas of the 
inseparability of those two concepts manifest themselves in non-Western cultures? 
2. Re ‘responsibility towards nature’. What could be the practical implications of such 
ideas? And moreover: What could be done to promote the impact of the ideas and 
practises on the globally dominating development, including the globally dominating 
problem-solving models, not only at the level of content, but also at the level of context? 
Evidently, responses to question 2 will challenge well-established scientific, technological, 
economic, and political ideas and practises and confront well-established lifestyles. Exactly 
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therefore, and as a motivation for change, it is important that responses to question 1 include 
positively engaging perspectives on the good life. 
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